Минали стипендианти

Feminisms have always liked the body. The reason is somewhat reactionary, and the reaction is largely forgotten throughout centuries. It is rooted in Aristotle’s hylomorphism and its identification of the feminine principle with ugliness. Embracing this identification becomes the locus classicus of feminist philosophy’s project to institute femininity as both embodied and rational. Two sources have inspired feminist theorists to reduce and thus defend philosophical femininity as symptomatically embodied: Plotinus (Enneads, III.6) and Irigaray’s interpretation of him (Speculum of the Other Woman). In this project I critique Irigaray’s reading as central to demystifying the reduction of femininity to embodiment. My aim is to then build on this critique and offer a trajectory of interpreting femininity and womanhood as equally relevant to the Plotinian ideal of disembodiment which has traditionally been in turn reduced to a masculine project.